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Abstract
In this commentary, I draw parallels between the sophists’ and the Socratic
account of meaning that McCabe reconstructs from the Euthydemus and
views on logic and language found in the works of classical authors of
analytic philosophy. I argue that the ingredients of the sophist’s account
of truth, which McCabe describes as ‘chopped logos’, correspond to widely
held philosophical theses concerning meaning. It shares three of its four
ingredients with the direct reference theory of the meanings of proper names.
The sophists need a notion of meaning applicable to sayings, not names:
they require a notion of truth. This is provided by the remaining ingredient,
which is a version of the principle that meanings are truth conditions. The
Euthydemus demonstrates dramatically that the combination of the four
ingredients is unpalatable. Building on McCabe’s point that chopped logos
does not get the conditions of failure of sayings right, I conclude that, as the
sophists have no notion of falsity of sayings, they have neither a notion of
truth nor of meaning.
The sophists have striking ideas about meaning. Or maybe it is better to
say that they force striking ideas upon Ctesippus. According to the sophists,
McCabe explains, ‘sayings have content, describing what the sayings are of ;
and what they are of is their thing, their pragma. This thing they are of fully
determines the content of the statement ... the logos I say will correspond exactly
to what it is of, whatever that is; and what it is of is what makes it true.’ (6f)1 I
will call this the sophistic theory of meaning, rather than the sophists’ theory of
meaning: ‘the sophists eschew theory’ (3). The Euthydemus demonstrates the
absurd consequences of this theory. McCabe’s article shows how difficult it
is to refute, and not because of the sophists’ attitude. What the sophists say
is worth taking seriously – even if they themselves are not – and demands a
philosophical response. In the following, I will further underpin this claim by
drawing parallels between the sophistic theory and contemporary theories of
meaning. The sophistic theory respects plausible and commonly accepted views
about meaning. It is not just a curiosity some of Plato’s contemporaries may
have been puzzled about. Plato still has something to show us.2
Recall the four ingredients of chopped logos (7f):
1Numbers in brackets refer to pages of ‘First Chop your Logos ...’.
2I would like to thank Fiona Leigh for the invitation to comment, and MM McCabe for her paper
and for many enlightening philosophical discussions.
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1. The relation between a chopped logos and its pragma is ‘exclusive, exhaustive
and determinate.’
2. Chopped logoi are units that ‘resist disaggregation; the correspondence is
one-to-one as a whole, or not at all’.
3. The relation between a chopped logos and its pragma ‘explicates both truth
and meaning at once. What the logos means, it says; and what it says, is so.’
4. There are neither truth-functional nor higher order relations between chopped
logoi.
A theory of meaning requires clarity about the categories of expressions.
Chopped logoi are, on the face of it, sentences, because the sophistic theory
constitutes an attempt to characterise the content of sayings, and sentences say
things: sentences are the category of expressions to which the concept of truth
applies.
A closer look at McCabe’s four ingredients of chopped logos, however, reveals
that the second and fourth ingredients are common to chopped logoi and proper
names.
The second ingredient means that chopped logoi are not compositional and
have no semantically significant structure. The same is true for proper names
like ‘Theodorus’ and ‘Dionysodorus’. Some proper names are composed from
other expressions, but their composition is not semantically significant. Even
though the words making up the name ‘The Eleatic Stranger’ are not picked at
random, but because the person named is a stranger from Elea, nonetheless, ‘The
Eleatic Stranger’ names the stranger from Elea, not because he is the stranger
from Elea, but because Theodorus introduces him by saying he brought with
him ‘a stranger from Elea’ (Sophist 216a2-3, tr. Fowler)3 and thereby gives him
that name. His act of naming would not have gone wrong had there been
another stranger from Elea in the Lyceum. Contrast with ‘the way to Larissa’:
even if there was only one way to Larissa, what is being talked about by that
expression depends on where Larissa is and how to get there, by what is meant
by ‘Larissa’ and ‘being a way to’. Proper names do not get their meanings from
their composition, as they may not be composed. The syntactic structure a
proper name may exhibit is not semantically relevant.
The fourth ingredient is that there are no truth-functional or higher order
relations between chopped logoi. (8) Neither are there between between names.
‘If Euthydemus, then Dionysodorus’ is meaningless, and so are ‘Euthydemus
and Dionysodorus’ and ‘Euthydemus or Dionysodorus’, if ‘and’ and ‘or’ are
truth functions. Applying a name to another, as in ‘Euthydemus Dionysodorus’,
does not produce a meaningful expression either. Complex grammatical subjects
such as ‘Euthydemus and Dionysodorus’ and ‘Euthydemus or Dionysodurus’
are not names. There is no one thing named by ‘Euthydemus or Dionysodorus’
in ‘Who is speaking, Euthydemus or Dionysodorus?’, nor by ‘Euthydemus and
Dionysodorus’ in ‘Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are arguing’.
In as much as chopped logoi share features with proper names, the first
ingredient of chopped logos places the sophistic theory of meaning for sayings
in the vicinity of a specific theory of meaning for proper names: the direct
reference theory. This theory is generally traced back to Mill. Proper names ‘are
3He is not quite so neatly introduced in White’s translation, where Theodorus presents him as
‘this man who is visiting us’.
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simply marks used to enable [...] individuals to be made subjects of discourse.’
(Mill, J.S., 1882, book 1, chapter 2, §5) Proper names contribute only their bearers
to the meanings of sentences in which they occur. The meaning of a proper
name is exhausted by its bearer. Proper names are mere tags of objects, in
Barcan Marcus’s terminology. (Barcan Marcus, 1961, 310) A tag tags exactly one
thing, which is just as McCabe describes the first ingredient of chopped logos:
‘the relation between a logos and what is of is exact: exclusive, exhaustive and
determinate’ (7). Chopped logoi are tags of their pragma.
If a tag is attached to more than one thing, then those things are treated as
a unity for the purpose of tagging. When Theodorus hands the stranger from
Elea the name tag ‘The stranger from Elea’, the tag does not tag the limbs, head,
torso and soul, if you wish, of the stranger from Elea, but them as a whole, even
if the person was merely the aggregate of its physical and mental constituents.
‘Athens’ does not tag the Acropolis, the Agora etc. the but the city of Athens,
even if there is no more to that city than its parts.
Something that is not tagged to anything is not a tag in the sense intended
by the direct reference theory. The analogy between naming and tagging invites
a comparison of proper names to tags for luggage, folders, parcels, etc. or name
tags for people. Such tags may not (yet) tag anything and may never do so.
The direct reference theory can exclude them, they are not (yet) serving their
purpose.
Although the sophists would resit any further exploration of the theory, a
serious direct reference theorist may want to say few more words about names
such as ‘Pegasus’ or, indeed, the names of characters in Plato’s dialogues, who,
McCabe argues, are characters of fiction, despite their affinities to real persons.
(McCabe, MM, 2000)4 But whatever a direct reference theorist may say about
names of fiction, if the meaning of a proper name is exhausted by the object it
names, and there is nothing to be named, something has gone wrong.
Two syntactically identical expressions can name more than one person,
as, for instance, ‘Socrates’ names the old Socrates and the young Socrates of
the Statesman. For the direct reference theory, however, these are semantically
two different names. They contribute different objects to the meaning of an
utterance such as the Eleatic Stranger’s ‘Socrates, do you hear what Socrates
says?’ (Statesman 258a7, tr. Rowe) Old Socrates could instead be called ‘Osocrates’
and young Socrates ‘Ysocrates’.
Two syntactically different expressions, can be proper names of the same
object, but for the direct reference theory, semantically they are the same proper
name. If ‘The Morning Star’ is a tag for the same object as ‘The Evening Star’,
then they mean the same thing. If they mean different things, they cannot both
be proper names of the planet Venus, but must name something else, maybe its
appearances at different times of the day.
The view that the meanings of proper names are exhausted by their bearers
is not unattractive. It is an educated guess that most philosophers of language
agree that Mill was fundamentally right about the semantics of proper names.
Were the sophists to restrict their claims to ingredients one, two and four of
4Plato says next to nothing about who Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are. Are they such surreal
characters that no real person could suffer any affinity with them? Are they worse than Heraclitus
and Protagoras, agreeing, as they appear to do, that their father is a dog and a boar, their siblings
sea urchins, gudgeons, puppies and piglets? (Euthydemus 298c8-d6, following Kent Sprague’s
translation.)
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chopped logos, they would merely put forward the most commonly held theory
of meaning for that specific category of expressions.
The crux lies in the third ingredient, which introduces the notion of truth:
the truth and meaning of a chopped logos are inseparable. It is this aspect of the
sophistic theory of meaning that makes it one about sayings.
The third ingredient of chopped logos is a sophistic version of the common
view that meaning and truth are closely related: the meanings of sentences are
their truth conditions. McCabe argues that ‘it is common ground to Socrates
and the sophists that to say, legein, is an action (prattein), and that logoi are
somehow related to (some corresponding) pragmata. [...] For the activity of
legein, the sophists declare – and Socrates and his friends seem to agree – that
the relation between the sayings and the things is the truth-telling relation.’ (19f)
Many philosophers agree, too, amongst whom Frege: the meaning, or sense, in
his terminology, of a sentence, the thought it expresses, is that the conditions
for its truth are fulfilled. (Frege, 1893, §32) The sophists twist this reasonable
view into the denial of the claim that the truth-telling relation may fail to hold
between meaningful items and the things by combining it with the other three
ingredients of chopped logos.
The view that emerges is that the sophistic theory of meaning treats sentences
as proper names, where the semantics of proper names is given by the direct
reference theory. It is a direct reference theory of logoi. The result is an equation
of truth conditions with truth. The sophists’ desired conclusions follow. If I
name a thing one way, and you name the same thing another way, then there
is a chance we’ll end up taking past each other, but we are not contradicting
each other. If I give a thing a name and you don’t, then, although we may not
share the same interests, this gives us no grounds for argument. An attempt at
naming can go wrong, if there is nothing to be named, but then no naming has
happened. As McCabe puts it, ‘if and only if I say, what I say is about the pragma
and true.’ (20) A saying is true if and only if it is meaningful. You either speak
truly or you don’t speak at all. Falsehood and countersaying are impossible.
Realising what has struck him, Ctesippus falls silent.
If chopped logoi are proper names, the question arises, what are they proper
names of? As chopped logoi are true, the obvious suggestion is that they are
proper names of facts or truth makers.
The view that sentences name facts or truth makers is not unattractive.
Replace ‘name’ by ‘refer to’. According to Dummett, Frege used ‘the name/bearer
relation as the prototype of the relation of an expression to its referent.’ (Dummett,
1981, 190) Some may even argue that naming is the paradigm of linguistic
use, with everything else falling into place. This is the picture of language
Wittgenstein attributed to Augustine and his former self. (Wittgenstein, 1953,
§1, §46) Less dramatically, Dummett, who agrees with Frege that reference is
a phenomenon broader than just the relation between a name and its bearer,
proposes that reference may be the core notion of a theory of meaning, with
truth a special case of reference.
Fleshing out some more what reference is, Dummett writes that ‘the realm
of reference just is reality, that reality of which we speak and in virtue of which
the thoughts which we express are true or false’ (Dummett, 1981, 153f) and that
‘the referents of our words are what we talk about.’ (Dummett, 1981, 196) With
this characterisation of reference, extending the notion of reference to parts of
speech other than names, it is natural to say that predicates and verbs refer
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to properties or universals, as did Russell. (Russell, 2001, 145) And to what
should sentences refer other than facts or truth makers? Russell expressed this
view in one of his most famous works. ‘Out of any proposition we can make a
denoting phrase, which denotes an entity if the proposition is true, but does not
denote an entity if the proposition is false.’ (Russell, 1905, 490) Russell treats
those entities as certain kinds of complex objects. ‘If A loves B, there is such
a complex object as “A’s love for B,” and vice versa; thus the existence of this
complex object gives the condition for the truth of the judgement “A loves B.”’
(Russell, 1910, 183) According to Russell’s celebrated analysis, ‘denoting phrases
never have any meaning in themselves, but [...] every proposition in whose
verbal expression they occur has a meaning.’ (Russell, 1905, 480) In ‘the proper
analysis’, denoting phrases disappear and every sentence in which they occur is
assigned a proposition as its meaning that uses as primitives only expressions
of predicate logic. Thus the meaning of any sentence in which ‘the complex of
A’s love for B’ occurs, such as ‘The complex of A’s love for B exists’, is given by a
sentence in which it does not occur, in this case ‘A loves B’. Nonetheless, Russell
asserts that there is a close link between the existence of certain complexes and
the truth conditions or meanings of propositions.
If truth is a special case of reference and sentences names of facts, the sophists
get what they want. The problem is not that the sophistic theory of meaning
treats sentences as proper names. It reappears if they are part of a broader
category comprising also complex names.5 Even though in the Euthydemus
logoi are treated as unstructured, in the Theaetetus the problem is formulated
independently of structure. At 189a6-189b2, Socrates presents the following
brief argument: ‘A man who is judging some one thing is judging something
which is. Then that means that a man who is judging something which is not is
judging nothing. But a man who is judging nothing is not judging at all. And
so it is not possible to judge what is not, either about the things which are or
just by itself.’ (Following Levett’s translation, turning Socrates’ questions into
assertions and omitting Theaetetus’ interjections.) Never mind the structure
of the name. I’m not talking about anyone with ‘the present King of France’
and the phrase cannot get its meaning from its purported reference to such
a person. The meaning of a proposition is its truth condition. According to
Russell, the latter is given by the existence of a certain complex object. But there
is no difference between a complex object and the existence of a complex object.
So the meaning of a proposition is given by a certain complex object. Take away
the object, and there is nothing that could do the giving. There is no such thing
as the non-existence of a certain complex object. Without that complex object,
there is neither truth condition nor meaning. There seems to be no way around
the conclusion that either there are no false propositions or they are meaningless.
The sophists’ traps are laid widely.
The argument in the last paragraph is confirmed by Anscombe, who points
out that Russell changed his mind on the nature of propositions (Russell, 1918,
507) in reaction to the problem of falsity posed by Plato and which is the target of
McCabe’s paper.6 The sophistic theory’s simultaneous explanation of meaning
and truth delivers on what is expected from a respectable theory of meaning.
There may be different conceptions of truth, but according to Dummett ‘under
5Denyer draws a similar conclusion from the Euthydemus (Denyer, 1991, chapter 2).
6See (Anscombe, G. E. M., 1971, first chapters). Anscombe quotes Theaetetus 189a6-189b2 on p.13.
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any theory of meaning whatever [...] we can represent the meaning (sense) of a
sentence as given by the condition for it to be true, on some appropriate way
of construing ‘true’.” (Dummett, 1978, xii) To establish that meaning cannot
be explained independently of truth requires an explication of the role of truth
within the theory of meaning: ‘the notion of truth has no place in the theory of
meaning unless there is such a connection [between meaning and truth]; and
it therefore becomes a requirement on the theory of meaning that it make this
connection explicit.’ (Dummett, 1993b, 20) A theory of meaning is not just a
theory of meaning, but one of truth, too. ‘The concept of truth is intimately
bound up with the concept of meaning; no philosophical elucidation of either
concept is to be had which does not at the same time provide an elucidation of
the other one.’ (Dummett, 1993a, 118)
The sophistic theory of meaning cheerfully accepts the challenge. It elucidates
truth by assimilating it to the paradigm case of reference, the relation between
a name and its bearer. It makes the connection between meaning and truth
explicit by equating meaning with truth. McCabe’s presentation of the sophistic
theory of meaning suggests that the theory of truth that goes with it is, or at
least is consistent with, a version of the correspondence theory: true sentences
correspond to the facts they refer to.
This should suffice to establish that the sophistic theory of meaning is not
mere sophistry, even if that is the use to which the sophists put it. The Euthydemus
demonstrates in dramatic form why the theory can’t be right. Its consequences
are obviously absurd. None of those present in the Lyceum are, I imagine,
siblings to sea urchins. But because the sophistic theory of meaning integrates
serious philosophical positions, those reluctant to accept it as a genuine theory
of meaning need a serious argument.
McCabe argues that to show where the sophists went wrong, Socrates offers
a teleological account of saying that is modelled on his solution to the problem
of how learning is possible. Learning is a complex process with an aim: to
acquire knowledge or understanding or competence. Success is not guaranteed.
Socrates achieves more than merely detecting an ambiguity in the verb ‘to
learn’: ‘Socrates may, instead, be distinguishing two different aspects (in the
grammatical sense) of learning: imperfective (the endeavour of learning: “I
learn”) versus perfective (the learning that one has when one has learned: “I
have learned”, “I am learned”).’ (14) McCabe underlines that the distinction
requires metaphysical support. ‘Socrates needs to show that there is such a
thing as a process and continuity and development rather than a succession of
new and distinct events.’ (16) Learning and having learnt are not two different
states, but the same state in different stages.
The discussion of the sophistic theory of meaning as a direct reference theory
of logos highlights McCabe’s point. If Socrates’ aim was merely to point out
‘that the verb “to learn” is used of two quite different mental processes or
states (“learning” and “understanding”)’ (13), then he would have no argument
against the sophists. Sentences could still be mere tags. In one sense, ‘Clinias
learns’ tags Clinias’ learning, in another it tags Clinias’ understanding. An
ambiguity in the verb ‘to learn’ is no more a problem for the sophistic theory of
meaning than the dual use of ‘Socrates’ in the Statesman is for the direct reference
theory of proper names.
On Socrates’ account, McCabe explains, saying is similar to learning. It is an
activity with an aim: truth. Thus saying can miss its target. The comparison
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of saying to learning makes sense of the way sayings normally occur. The
purpose of saying things, or of communication, is rarely to transmit isolated
pieces of information. More often, sayings are part of a conversation. We are
both speakers and hearers. The aim and the aiming are complex. Sayings are
subject to criticism: they should have adequate grounds. These grounds are
interwoven with other sayings and often inconclusive. You can request to hear
the reasons for my saying, point out that I’m wrong or that my grounds are
insufficient. ‘Saying, on this account, is extended, continuous and responsive to
questions, just because what it is directed at is something complex: a body of
truth (like a body of knowledge) rather than just a single claim.’ (25) Failure
comes in more than one variety. I may fail to speak truly, but I may also fail to
have adequate grounds for my saying, even though what I say is true. I may fail
to provide sufficient reasons for my sayings or fail to make my sayings cohere.
As a result, I may change my mind and retract what I said: ‘not only do I try
to speak the truth; but I reflect on whether I am doing so, and commit myself
to the result of that reflection when I speak, or revise what I say.’ (26) Sayings
also have consequences. Accepting a saying commits us to accepting further
sayings and actions to be performed in the light of the acceptance. The sophistic
theory of meaning, where sayings are isolated tags, cannot make sense of these
complex interactions between speakers.
McCabe’s analysis of Socrates’ account of logos stresses that sayings are
embedded in complex practices of interaction, tied to the grounds we have for
making assertions and the consequences following from them, the conditions
under which we make and retract assertions. This is something we also find
in Dummett’s writings on the theory of meaning. Our linguistic practice is
governed by principles ‘that have to do with the circumstances that warrant
an assertion, the basis on which we may recognise a statement as having
been established [...:] we need to know when we are entitled to make any
given assertion, and when we are required to acknowledge it as true. [...]
Clearly, however, our use of the language cannot be exhaustively described
in terms of [these principles alone]. If that were all, we should be skilled
at making assertions but incapable of responding to the assertions of others.
[...] In acquiring language, we learn a variety of principles determining the
consequences of possible utterances.’ (Dummett, 1993b, 210ff) McCabe’s Socratic
account adds that there are two facets to each of the two principles. We may
successfully give the grounds for our sayings or fail to do so, we may successfully
follow up on the consequences of our sayings or fail to do so. The Socratic
account also adds the importance of the development of thoughts, attitudes and
personality in conversation.7
Sayings, then, can go wrong in all kinds of ways: I speak falsely, I do not
have adequate grounds for my saying, my saying fails to cohere with other
things I said, I fail to make good on my saying. By contrast, there is a sense in
which naming cannot go wrong. If I decide to tag an object, this is its name in
my usage and anyone else’s I may convince to follow. A failure to tag an object
is not a special kind of tagging, but no tagging at all. I may think that I have
named a winged horse ‘Pegasus’, while in fact I fail to do so, because there are
no mythical animals, but, traumatic as such a case may be, if there is no object to
7Strangely Dummett has no convincing answer to the problem of falsity. His account of meaning
allows for the possibility that all sentences of a language are true. See (Kürbis, 2015).
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be named, no naming has happened. If there is no object to name, you haven’t
named. If you speak falsely, unjustifiedly, incoherently or misleadingly, you
have nonetheless spoken.
The conditions of failure and success for naming and saying are different.
Saying can fail in ways that naming can not. Thus saying is different from
naming.8
The last conclusion overstates the case slightly. It might still be possible to
think of sentences as names, as long as they do not name facts. Frege held that
sentences are names, not necessarily proper ones, of two very special, logical
objects, the True and the False. All true sentences name the True, all false
sentences the False. This ensures that false sentences refer. For Frege, names
refer to objects and predicates, not to properties or universals, but to functions
from objects to truth values. Differences in meaning are located in the senses
of expressions, not, as for Russell, in their references. (See (Anscombe, G. E.
M., 1971, 45)) Notice also that Russell’s facts are structured, while Frege’s truth
values are not. The sophists are quite right to insist that chopped logoi resist
disaggregation.9
Setting aside the Fregean option, we can conclude that reference, reduced to
a kind of naming, and reference failure cannot do the job of truth and falsity.
There is more to meaning than naming.
That meaning and truth are tied in Dummett’s sense is not uncontroversial.
The view presupposes that truth, like meaning, is a substantial notion. It must
reject the deflationary theory of truth, attributed to Ramsey: ‘there really is
no separate problem of truth [...] It is evident that “It is true that Caesar was
murdered” means no more than that Caesar was murdered.’ (Ramsey, 1978,
157)10 Whether severing the ties between truth and meaning is a way to escape
the sophists is questionable. Whatever the essence of meaning, the world we
talk about should be of some importance, and so the problem of falsity remains
pertinent.11
Two extreme theories of the relation between meaning and truth are worth
mentioning. Tarksi’s definition of truth for formalised languages employs
sentences of one language to specify the truth conditions of sentences in another,
so he defines truth in terms of a primitive notion of sameness of meaning. (Tarski,
1956, 187f) Davidson uses Tarski’s T-schema to specify the meanings of sentences
of the object language and thus defines meaning in terms of a primitive notion
of truth. (Davidson, 2001a, xvi) Dummett is somewhere inbetween.12 What
everyone on the spectrum from Tarski to Davidson agrees on is that the meaning
is compositional. The meanings of sentences are determined by the meanings of
the expressions occurring in them and how they are assembled.
8Prior, who discusses the problem of falsehood in relation to the correspondence theory of truth,
also concludes that ‘naming is one thing, saying or stating another.’ (Prior, 1967, 228)
9Compare also Davidson’s slingshot argument (Davidson, 2001b).
10For discussion of the deflationary theory and problems it faces with the liar paradox, see Marques
(2018).
11Frege accepted that ‘p’ and ‘It is true that p’ have the same content, so he may have been
sympathetic to some aspects of the redundancy theory. But obviously he did not hold a redundancy
theory of the True. According to Frege, nothing is added to a thought by ascribing truth to it, just
like, one might observe, according to Kant nothing is added to an object by ascribing existence to it.
Frege expresses doubts that truth is a property. It is sui generis: ‘the content of the word “true” is
very peculiar and undefinable’. (Frege, 1918a, 60f)
12For another intermediate position, inspired by Dummett, see (Weiss, 2007).
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A theme of the Euthydemus is the drawing and ignoring of distinctions.
Socrates corrects Crito: he was talking to two strangers, not one. Socrates reminds
Clinias that the same word can mean different things. Even Ctesippus draws
distinctions: ‘my noble Dionysodorus, do not call countersaying annoyance:
for countersaying is something different’ (285d4-6)13. At 290b3-290d8, Clinias
suddenly appears to have read the Republic,14 and the dialogue turns from
Socrates’ narrative to the frame story, his encounter with Crito. The question
arises whether it could really have been Clinias who had spoken so eloquently or
whether some superior being was present. As the frame story continues, different
kinds and ways of conducting conversations are demonstrated. Socrates asks
for clarifications to avoid that ‘you ask a question with one thing in mind and
I understand it with another’ (295c4-5, tr. Kent Sprague). The sophists tear
distinctions down and demand that Socrates ignore them. But the dialogue
shows that they, too, acknowledge distinctions: there are Socrates’ ‘wrong’
responses and the ‘right’ ones that let them play their game.15
A very important distinction gets ignored at (285e9-286a1):
‘Are there sayings [logoi] for each of the things there are?’
‘Certainly.’
‘And is a saying for each thing as the thing is or as it is not?’
‘As it is.’16
At first Dionysodorus talks about things: the sayings are construed as names.
Then he shifts to the way things are: the sayings are construed as predications.
Ctesippus underwrites his demise by not paying attention to the shift.
Plato draws the distinction between names and verbs and their different
functions in the Sophist (261e4ff). The distinction contributes to the solution
of two problems, the problem of the difference between a list of words like
‘walks runs sleeps’ and ‘lion stag horse’, which say nothing, and sentences like
‘Theaetetus sits’ and ‘Theaetetus flies’, which say something, and the problem
of how sentences can be false yet meaningful.
For simplicity I’ll classify the verbs amongst the predicates. Together the
Euthydemus and the Sophist show that sentences are neither names nor lists
of names, and that naming is different from predication. And at least in the
simplest cases, those discussed in the Sophist, predication requires differentiation
between what does and what does not satisfy a predicate.
Compositionality requires that the meanings of complex expressions are
determined by the simplest expressions occurring in them and the way they are
assembled. But not only are sentences composed of simpler expressions, they
are composed of expressions that serve different functions.17
13McCabe’s translation, see ‘First chop your logos ...’ (4).
14An observation I owe to McCabe.
15For much of the dialogue it seems irrelevant whether Euthydemus or Dionysodorus speaks, or
whether there are one or two sophists. In this episode, it is not. Euthydemus tells Dionysodorus off
for letting Socrates destroy the argument by asking back. ‘And Dionysodorus blushed.’ (297a7-8, tr.
Kent Sprague) We see them as persons when they get cross with Socrates and each other.
16McCabe’s translation, see ‘First chop your logos ...’ (4).
17Ctesippus final exclamation when debate breaks down, ‘Bravo, Heracles, what a fine argument!’,
elicits the oddest question of them all, ‘And Dionysodorus said, Is Heracles a bravo, or is a bravo
Heracles?’ (303a6-8, tr. Kent Sprague). The different functions of expressions, that previously even
the sophists respected to some degree, are finally overthrown.
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Sayings can fail not least because they come in opposites: true and false,
assertion and denial, affirmation and negation. I aim at the truth, my aim fails
and I speak falsely. I should have done the opposite: denied what I asserted,
negated what I affirmed. There is no opposite of naming. There is no naming an
opposite object. Objects do not have opposites. Predicates come in contradictory
pairs, names don’t.18
In the Sophist, Plato writes that ‘since there is true and false speech, and [...]
thinking appeared to be the soul’s conversation with itself, belief the conclusion
of thinking, and what we call appearing the blending of perception and belief, it
follows that since these are all the same kind of thing as speech, some of them
must sometimes be false.’ (264a8-b4, tr. White) This sounds false at first: why
shouldn’t there be some lucky thinkers who never think falsehoods? Frege,
however, observes that there must be false thoughts, because otherwise we
cannot explain the meaning of negated sentences compositionally: ¬p is true if
and only if p is false. (Frege, 1918b) We sometimes need to consider falsities,
if only to reject them, as we would in a proof by contradiction, or, indeed, a
Socratic dialogue.
Socrates’ account of meaning shows ‘that there is a great deal more to
be said about the things that correspond to the words than is allowed by an
“exact” sophistic account of language, truth and meaning.’ (15) Naming may
be momentary, but predication can be diachronic. To be able to speak truly
about such process such as learning, the meanings of our words need to remain
fixed while the process moves on. The concept expressed by or the sense of the
predicate remains stable, while the process changes aspects and we continue to
speak truly.
The third ingredient of chopped logos is the odd one out. If truth is essentially
different from the relation between a name and its bearer, then, although the
sophists may have some conception of the latter, they do not have a notion of
truth. And so, due to the intimate connection between saying and truth, the
sophists have no account of saying either.19
Conversely, if the sophists have no account of saying, then, by the close
connection between saying and truth, they have no account of truth either. But
truth is the link between language and reality. What the sophists say is cut off
from reality.
The consequences of the sophistic theory of meaning are dire. The sophists
‘are not self-refuters, but refuters of the self.’ (28) The second half of this
commentary gives another way of looking at this conclusion. Knowledge and
belief are propositional attitudes. The sophists may have something to say about
naming, but they have no account of truth and no account of the meanings of
propositions, no account of what can take the place of p in ‘I know that p’ and
‘I believe that p’. They can utter the words that their father is a dog and their
mother a sea urchin, but, on the sophistic theory of meaning, far from everyone
knowing everything, no one knows or even believes anything, as it is not an
account of the kind of thing that can be known or believed.20
18Geach uses this observation to prove that no name is a predicate. (Geach, 1962, 31ff)
19If we accept Frege’s context principle, the sophists do not even have a notion of naming: ‘It is
necessary to ask for the meaning of words in the context of a sentence, not in isolation.’ (Frege, 1884,
XXII)
20Aristotle makes a similar move with respect to the apparent deniers of the law of non-
contradiction. ‘The many writers on nature’ may use contradictory language, but they cannot
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In this commentary I followed up some of McCabe’s thoughts to draw
attention to the relevance of Plato to contemporary investigations in the theory
of meaning and philosophical logic. Those began with Frege. To my knowledge,
Frege never refers to Plato. A strange omission from the man who wrote that
‘if in the constant flux of things nothing firm, eternal, ever lasted, then the
intelligibility of the world would cease and everything collapse into confusion.’
(Frege, 1884, XIX) The problem of falsity is of crucial importance to Frege, too, for
whom, as for Plato on McCabe’s account, it is not something to be avoided down
the line, but a starting point of logical investigations (see (Frege, 1918b)). The
similarities between Plato and Frege are noticeable. And despite the differences,
it seems to me that Frege and Plato grappled with very similar issues in the
foundations of logic. I think McCabe will agree.
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